CFR: U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation

After months of quiet negotiations, the United States has announced a $1.4 billion, two-year package to help the Mexican government combat organized crime. Dubbed “Plan Mexico” by the media, in reference to Plan Colombia, a multibillion dollar counternarcotics initiative, the aid package will provide funds for police training, equipment, and intelligence gathering. But some question whether such measures are enough to stem Mexico's security troubles and shore up its weak institutions.

Armand Peschard-Sverdrup, senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and president of Peschard-Sverdrup & Associates, LLC, and Jorge Chabat, professor at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico City, debate what an ideal security cooperation agreement would look like between the United States and Mexico.

Weigh in on this debate by emailing the editors at letters@cfr.org. To view other online debates click here.

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October 23, 2007

Jorge Chabat

I agree with Armand Peschard that an ideal U.S.-Mexico security cooperation agreement should include the strengthening of the institutions in both countries that are dedicated to combat security threats. The emphasis given in the Merida Initiative to improve the technological capabilities of the Mexican government goes in the right direction. The achievement of security needs the latest technology and this is a matter of money. However, this effort would be useless if the Mexican government is not able to fight corruption in the Mexican police forces. The lack of trust in Mexican police forces has complicated bilateral collaboration since the 1980s. From this perspective, the Merida Initiative is not enough. In the long term, cooperation between Mexico and the United States should include assistance for institution building in Mexico in the judiciary and the prison system. Technological assistance to fight organized crime is very important but if there is not a transformation of the institutional framework in Mexico, this battle would be unproductive.

I also agree with Armand that there is a need to strengthen the Mexican intelligence-gathering capability. This should be the cornerstone of the Mexican strategy against drug trafficking and other threats like terrorism. The recent attacks to oil infrastructure by the Popular Revolutionary Army reveal the weakness of the Mexican intelligence services. The U.S.-Mexico collaboration in this area has been one of the elements that explain the absence of terrorists in Mexican territory. However, the fact that the Mexican Intelligence agency (CISEN) has been used in the past for political purposes has generated big doubts about the professionalization of this office. This is one of the most important security challenges for Mexico.

The efforts developed by the Calderon Administration to unify the federal police forces have faced many obstacles, but this is an ongoing process. Last week the Mexican government announced the creation of a police model based in a new “Federal police” that will have a broad national presence. This model supposes also the establishment of a new police academy that will train police chiefs. An ideal security plan between Mexico and the United States should contemplate some training of Mexican policemen.

Certainly, the Mexican army is still reluctant to change and is less open to globalization than the navy. This is a process that will take years. However, during recent years there has been an important number of Mexican military who have been trained in the United States, which contributes to a better understanding of the foreign world. An ideal framework of cooperation between Mexico and the United States should contemplate this kind of exchanges, including U.S. military spending some time in Mexican military facilities.

Finally, an important aspect of U.S.-Mexico cooperation should be the control of gun smuggling from the United States to Mexico. This requires a clearer commitment from the U.S. government. It is not the only factor that fuels drug-related violence in Mexico but it is an important one. If the United States wants a more stable border, it should make more efforts to control arms sale in American territory.

October 22, 2007

Armand Peschard-Sverdrup

An ideal U.S.-Mexico security cooperation agreement would have to be based on the principle that the governments of the United States and Mexico must undertake various domestic as well as collective measures to more successfully confront the threats posed to both nations by transnational organized crime—such as drug trafficking, the diversion of chemical precursors for the illicit drug trade, human trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and even contraband. Thus, the agreement would have to include both countries’ commitment to a common set of objectives and strategies, as well as an intensified level of cooperation, information sharing, and coordination between the respective agencies.

The agreement would also have to address the institutional asymmetries that currently exist between the United States and Mexico. The countries would need to agree to strengthen the numerous institutions that play differing, yet equally vital, roles in targeting and combating these various security threats. The U.S. government would ideally help Mexico further strengthen the Center for Investigation and National Security [Mexican intelligence agency] and its intelligence-gathering capability so that the agency could more effectively counter the threats posed by nonstate actors—be they terrorists, organized crime, criminal gangs, or the Popular Revolutionary Army [Mexican guerrilla movement].

Mexico’s law enforcement agencies—the Federal Investigative Agency and the Federal Preventive Police—also need to be strengthened. President Calderón has expressed an interest in creating a unified command as well as a single federal police force for Mexico. However, it remains to be seen whether he can pull off such an organizational restructuring politically without the impetus of a compelling event. Strengthening law enforcement will increase Mexico’s ability to combat crime and therefore enhance the nation’s competitiveness from the standpoint of making it a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment. It also will strengthen rule of law, which will aid in the further consolidation of Mexican democracy.   

Given the level of trade between our two countries through the twenty-five ports of entry, we should continue to strengthen the operational capability of Mexico’s customs agency, which has one of the most progressive relationships with its U.S. counterpart—Customs and Border Patrol—and can serve as a model for the other agencies.

Given that Mexico’s army and navy are the only two institutions with a true nationwide deployment capability, it is in the interest of Mexico and the United States to continue to strengthen these institutions so that they can confront twenty-first-century threats. Mexico’s navy has always been more receptive to force transformation, but the army has been more hermetic and reticent to change. However, these days the army has a more progressive outlook not only because of generational change among its leadership, but also out of concern that the army will be passed over in the security-oriented appropriations that the Calderón government and the Mexican Congress will be earmarking in the next few years.