CFR: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)–comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan–began in 2001 as a confidence-building mechanism to resolve border disputes. In recent years, it has risen in stature and scope, making headlines in 2005 when it issued a timeline for U.S. forces to pull out of Uzbekistan. Some experts say the organization has emerged as a powerful anti-U.S. bulwark in the region, while others say that because of inherent frictions between its two main members, Russia and China, the SCO is unlikely to pose a threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia. Meanwhile, talks are under way to amend the group’s mission statement to include, among other things, increased military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism drills. Iran is currently one of four observers to the SCO. It requested full membership in March, prompting speculation about the future direction of the SCO.

Originally called the Shanghai Five, the SCO formed in 1996 largely to demilitarize the border between China and the former Soviet Union. In 2001, the organization added Uzbekistan and renamed itself the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Mongolia won observer status in 2004; Iran, Pakistan, and India became observers the following year. The SCO has since risen in regional prominence, tackling issues of trade, counterterrorism, and drug trafficking. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the organization is not a mutual defense pact. But the SCO has held a number of joint military exercises, most recently in 2007 near Russia’s Ural Mountains. Some experts cite a convergence of interests among members in recent years, including improved ties between China and Russia and the perceived threat posed by U.S. forces in the region. Others, including Lieutenant General William E. Odom, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, say the SCO is being used by Russia and China as a vehicle to assert their influence in Central Asia and curb U.S. access to the region’s vast energy supplies.

SCO members say U.S. bases in the region, established in the wake of 9/11, were not meant to be permanent and were only installed to assist the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. China and Russia have chafed at the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, an energy-rich region both consider within their sphere of influence. After uprisings in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan unseated leaders loyal to the Kremlin, Russia has viewed the U.S. presence in post-Soviet states with increasing suspicion. Many in Moscow argue the so-called color revolutions were the work of U.S.-funded nongovernmental organizations. Beijing sees the U.S. military presence along its western border as part of Washington’s strategy to contain China, experts say.

On July 5, 2005, the SCO issued a declaration implicitly calling for the United States to set a timeline for withdrawing its military forces from Karshi-Khanabad Air Base, located in southern Uzbekistan. But experts say relations between Uzbekistan and Washington were already on the skids. After 9/11, Uzbekistan became a strategic partner of the United States, cooperating with American forces on counterterrorism issues and allowing use of the Karshi-Khanabad air base. In return, Uzbekistan received security guarantees and military equipment. Yet a May 2005 uprising in Andijan province, followed by a brutal crackdown by the Uzbek authorities, led to sharp criticisms from Washington. The Uzbek government also grew suspicious of U.S. involvement in pro-democracy revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Hence, the Uzbek government ended its military cooperation with the United States and moved to eject U.S. forces from Karshi-Khandabad. The SCO declaration, most experts say, merely accelerated the withdrawal of U.S. forces, which was completed by the end of 2005.

Not that strong, but growing, most experts say. “The basic picture is the SCO is not as important as people in Washington think,” says Daniel Kimmage, an expert on Central Asia at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The SCO serves more as a forum to discuss issues of trade and security than a fully-developed counterpoint to NATO. “If you take NATO as your standard for organizational effectiveness,” Kimmage says, “the SCO is not even close yet.” Plus, unlike NATO, there are no mutual defense pledges. Also holding back the organization’s effectiveness are internal divisions and tensions between its member states, particularly China and Russia over issues of energy and the construction of ports in the region. Finally, multilateral institutions historically have a poor track record in the region. “Most countries do serious stuff bilaterally,” Kimmage says.

That said, most experts agree that the SCO’s influence in the region is on the rise. “I think the current fears [of Iran joining] are overblown but that doesn’t mean the capacity isn’t there,” says Martha Brill Olcott, a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Others say a stronger SCO, particularly one with a military component and Iran as a full member, might serve as a check to U.S. interests and ambitions in the region. “An expanded SCO would control a large part of the world’s oil and gas reserves and nuclear arsenal,” David Wall, an expert on the region at the University of Cambridge’s East Asia Institute, told the Washington Times. “It would essentially be an OPEC with bombs.”

Since Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attended the Shanghai summit in 2006, there has been speculation that Iran might join the SCO. In March 2008, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki officially announced Iran’s bid, saying Tehran had submitted a request for full membership to the SCO Secretariat. As of now, there is no clear mechanism in place to expand the SCO and offer Iran—or any other potential member—formal membership.

Sergey Karaganov, chairman of the Russia-based Foreign and Defense Policy Council, says eventual membership could “be one of the carrots that [is] part of a larger deal” to resolve the current nuclear crisis with Iran. Also, membership “would allow China and Russia to influence more positively Iran’s foreign policy and, by implication, the Muslim world,” writes Kaveh Afrasiabi, an expert on Iran, in the Asia Times. Yet other analysts are more skeptical. “At a certain point it’ll become so diluted that China’s original interest [in the SCO]—to neutralize its western neighbors—will not have been lost but submerged amid other issues,” says S. Frederick Starr, an expert on Central Asia at Johns Hopkins University. Another problem is “nobody will trust the Iranians,” Olcott says. “[SCO members] may be cutting off their noses to spite their faces,” she says. “If they want to score geopolitical verbal punching points, it's a good move. But if you want it to function better, you get nothing by bringing in Iran.” RFL/RL reports that China and Russia are wary of making Iran a full member on the grounds that Iranian membership could give the SCO more of an anti-American tone.

In addition to a means for Iran to tighten its contacts with Russia, experts say Iran sees the SCO as a club of like-minded states important to its geostrategic interests in Central Asia. The SCO also complements Iran’s so-called “looking East” foreign policy, says Mohsen Sazegara, an Iranian dissident, policy activist, and former professor at Yale University. He says Iran has strong historical, cultural, and economic ties with many of the Central Asian countries. Iran also wants to cultivate a stronger relationship with larger states like India and China. “China gets a lot of energy from Iran and in the future wants to get more,” Starr says. But some experts question Tehran’s “Eastern” orientation. “I think as it becomes exposed and analyzed, [it] will prove to be more of a slogan than a policy,” said CFR Senior Fellow Ray Takeyh at a Middle East Policy Council Forum.

Perhaps, experts say. “Part of Iran’s foreign policy, at least in the mind of the Supreme Leader, is to be anti-U.S.,” Sazegara says. Further, Iran views the SCO as a potential guarantor of future security, experts say. Membership, for example, could offer Iran shelter from the international pressure put on Tehran to end its uranium-enrichment program. Similar protection was provided to Uzbekistan after the Andijan massacre in May 2005.