Defense Against Bioterror Called Weaker Than Ever

Newsday
Posted: 2007-10-05 20:09:07

More American research labs are working with dangerous toxins such as Ebola, smallpox and avian flu in an effort to boost the nation's biodefense, but oversight is fragmented "and, for the most part, relies on self-policing," investigators said Thursday.

That lack of accountability may make Americans less, rather than more, secure, six years after a mysterious plot involving anthrax sickened 22 people and killed five, testified Keith Rhodes, chief technologist for the Governmental Accountability Office.

"Biosafety Level-3 and Level-4 labs often contain the most dangerous infectious disease agents, for example, Ebola, smallpox, avian influenza and SARS, including those for which effective vaccines or treatment may not be available," he told a House subcommittee. "Although high-containment labs are designed to promote the safety of researchers and the public, accidents and security breaches have occurred in the past."

In addition, such facilities "can be used by terrorists, or people with malicious intent to acquire or develop harmful biological agents," he said. Yet no federal agency -- not even the FBI -- had a complete list.

One such lab on the drawing boards is the $450 million National Bio and Agro-Defense facility, a Biosafety Level-4 facility to replace the aging Plum Island Animal Research Center. Among the six sites considered is Plum Island itself, 11/2 miles off Orient Point. The other sites are in Texas, Mississippi, Georgia, North Carolina and Kansas.

Rhodes questioned the proliferation of high-containment labs without a coordinated national policy, and recommended better oversight.

He cited several security breaches, including the exposure and subsequent illness of a lab worker at Texas A&M University from the brucella bacteria; a power outage at the Centers for Disease Control's new Biosafety Level-4 lab in Atlanta, and the recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in England after the leak of the highly contagious virus from contaminated wastewater from a nearby lab.

Noting the brucella outbreak was reported to the CDC only after being revealed by a public advocacy group, Rhodes said that "no one knows whether the Texas A&M incidents are the tip of the iceberg or the iceberg."

But Dr. Richard Besser, director of terrorism preparedness and emergency response for the CDC, said that none of those incidents created a public health threat. Nonetheless, he said the agency planned to bolster lab inspections.

At one point, Committee Chairman John Dingell (D-Michigan) asked the GAO to look into proposals to relocate the Plum Island lab to the mainland, which he called "utterly baffling."

"We know from recent incidents in the UK that it [foot and mouth disease] can escape from even a high-level biosafety lab," Dingell said. ". . . Why then would DHS propose to move this Level-3 biolab that works with the most dangerous animal diseases in the world from Plum Island to the heart of farm country?" Rhodes agreed to look into the issue.